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NOT PRECEDENTIAL   
     
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______ 
 
No. 12-2637 
______ 
 
JAMES MABRY 
  Appellant 
 
v. 
 
J. T. SHARTEL 
______ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil No. 1-12-cv-02411) 
District Judge: Honorable Jerome B. Simandle 
______ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
June 23, 2015 
 
Before: CHAGARES, KRAUSE and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: November 18, 2015) 
______ 
 
OPINION 
______ 
 
VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judge 
 James Mabry appeals the final decision of the U.S. District Court for the District 
of New Jersey denying his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 habeas corpus motion for lack of 
                                              
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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jurisdiction. Mabry v. Shartel, No. 12-2411 (JBS), 2012 WL 1900592 (D.N.J. May 24, 
2012). We need not reach the jurisdictional question, however, because Appellant waived 
his right to challenge his conviction and sentence. Therefore, we will affirm the dismissal 
of the § 2241 petition.1  
I.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 In 2004, Mabry faced a six-count indictment including, in part, possession with 
intent to distribute cocaine and possession of a firearm during drug trafficking. United 
States v. Mabry, 536 F.3d 231, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (“Mabry I”). Mabry pleaded guilty to 
one count of possession with intent to distribute cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 
§§ 841(a)(1) & (b)(1)(B)(iii), in return for the dismissal of the remaining charges. Mabry 
I, 536 F.3d at 233. As part of his plea agreement, Mabry relinquished his right to direct 
appeal as well as his “right to challenge any conviction or sentence or the manner in 
which the sentence was determined in any collateral proceeding, including but not limited 
to a motion brought under Title 28, United States Code, Section 2255.” Id. at 233 
(internal quotation marks omitted). Mabry’s two prior convictions for simple assault, 
both violations of 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2701, triggered the career offender 
designation as “crime[s] of violence” under Section 4B1.1 of the United States 
Sentencing Guidelines (“Guidelines”). Mabry was thus sentenced as a career offender to 
210 months’ imprisonment. 
                                              
1 We may affirm for any reason supported by the record. Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 
187, 191 (3d Cir. 2011). 
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 Mabry, proceeding pro se in 2006, filed a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to 
vacate his sentence. He argued ineffective assistance of counsel and an erroneous career 
offender classification. Mabry I, 536 F.3d at 234–35. The District Court enforced 
Mabry’s appellate waiver and dismissed the petition. Id. at 235. We affirmed the 
dismissal, finding Mabry’s waiver knowing and voluntary and that its enforcement did 
not create a miscarriage of justice. Id. at 244. Two years after Mabry filed his motion, the 
Supreme Court decided Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 144–45 (2008), which held 
that the modified categorical approach is required to evaluate a state conviction pursuant 
to an ambiguous “crime of violence” statute. Thereafter, Mabry filed a second § 2255 
motion. United States v. Mabry, 417 F. App’x 168, 168–69 (3d Cir. 2011) (“Mabry II”).2 
Specifically, Mabry argued that the career offender sentencing enhancement was a 
miscarriage of justice and he was due an evidentiary hearing to reverse the classification. 
Id. at 169. The District Court denied the motion for lack of jurisdiction and observed that 
Mabry was attempting to relitigate his previous sentencing error claim. Id. We affirmed, 
holding that we were deprived of jurisdiction—Mabry’s second § 2255 motion was not 
authorized by a Third Circuit panel as the statute explicitly requires. Id. at 170; see 28 
U.S.C. § 2255(h).  
 Mabry resorted to the instant § 2241 petition. The District Court dismissed the 
petition for lack of jurisdiction, but did not address waiver. Mabry timely appealed. 
                                              
2 Mabry’s motion to reconsider his sentence was filed pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582. 
When a motion attacks the underlying conviction or sentence, it is treated as a § 2255 
motion—not as a direct criminal appeal. Mabry II, 417 F. App’x at 170 (citing United 
States v. Carter, 500 F.3d 486, 490 (6th Cir. 2007)). 
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II.  DISCUSSION3 
 Mabry argues that the career offender sentencing enhancement was improperly 
applied to him in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Begay and our decision in 
United States v. Marrero, 743 F.3d 389 (3d Cir. 2014).4 However, we need not reach the 
merits of his argument because Mabry’s appellate waiver forecloses review of his 
sentencing. See United States v. Corso, 549 F.3d 921, 926 (3d Cir. 2008) (citation 
omitted) (explaining that, where the government invokes an appellate waiver provision, 
“we must determine as a threshold matter whether the appellate waiver prevents us from 
exercising our jurisdiction to review the merits of the defendant’s appeal”).   
 Criminal defendants may waive constitutional and statutory rights, including the 
right to appeal or pursue collateral attacks, “provided they do so voluntarily and with 
knowledge of the nature and consequences of the waiver.” Mabry I, 536 F.3d at 236 
(citation omitted). We will enforce an appellate-waiver provision in a defendant’s plea 
agreement “where we conclude (1) that the issues [the defendant] pursues on appeal fall 
within the scope of his appellate waiver and (2) that he knowingly and voluntarily agreed 
                                              
3 The District Court had jurisdiction to review the initial petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 2241 and 2255. We have jurisdiction to review the District Court’s denial pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253. We exercise plenary review over the validity and scope of 
an appellate waiver. United States v. Wilson, 707 F.3d 412, 414 (3d Cir. 2013).   
4 Since Appellant’s briefing in this case, the Supreme Court decided Johnson v. United 
States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), which held that imposing a higher sentence under the 
residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act is unconstitutional due to the clause’s 
vagueness. Mabry’s career offender designation was under the Guidelines and not the 
Armed Career Criminal Act, but both provisions include an identically worded residual 
clause defining “crime of violence.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii); UNITED STATES 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES § 4B1.2(a)(2) (“or otherwise involves conduct that presents a 
serious potential risk of physical injury to another”).  
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to the appellate waiver, unless (3) enforcing the waiver would work a miscarriage of 
justice.” Wilson, 707 F.3d at 414 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. 
Dahmen, 675 F.3d 244, 249 (3d Cir. 2012)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
“[A]lthough arising in the criminal context,” appellate-waiver provisions in plea 
agreements should be “analyzed under contract law standards,” and construed against the 
Government. United States v. Williams, 510 F.3d 416, 422 (3d Cir. 2007) (citation 
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Under contract principles, a plea agreement 
necessarily ‘works both ways. Not only must the government comply with its terms and 
conditions, but so must [the defendant].’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting United 
States v. Carrara, 49 F.3d 105, 107 (3d Cir. 1995)).  
 We upheld the validity of the present appellate-waiver provision in a precedential 
opinion. Mabry I, 536 F.3d at 244. We discussed the terms and language contained in the 
plea agreement, noting that the District Court “discussed the wavier of direct appeal and 
collateral challenge rights at some length.” Id. at 233.5 We noted that defense counsel 
specifically explained to Mabry the meaning of “appellate and collateral waivers.” Id. at 
234. The District Court found the appellate waiver was entered into by Mabry knowingly 
and voluntarily, and we affirmed this conclusion. Id. at 237–39.  
 Mabry now argues that the scope of the waiver does not include the basis for his 
current challenge, and in the alternative, enforcing the waiver would work a miscarriage 
                                              
5 The District Court explained the consequences of the waiver to Mabry: “Do you 
understand that . . . unless there is an error which results in a miscarriage of justice, you 
will have no right to challenge in any appeal or collateral proceeding an incorrect or 
allegedly incorrect determination of the advisory sentencing guidelines?” Mabry I, 536 
F.3d at 234.  
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of justice. Mabry agreed to a broad waiver, encompassing all constitutional and non-
constitutional grounds, and explicitly waiving “the defendant’s right to challenge any 
conviction or sentence or the manner in which the sentence was determined in any 
collateral proceeding, including but not limited to a motion brought under Title 28, 
United States Code, Section 2255.” (App. 53). Although Mabry’s counsel specifically 
mentioned ineffective assistance of counsel claims as one example of “collateral attack,”6 
the broad language of the waiver extends further. Nor does any change in subsequent law 
render the plea invalid. See United States v. Lockett, 406 F.3d 207, 213 (3d Cir. 2005). 
“[A]bsent misrepresentation or other impermissible conduct by state agents, . . . a 
voluntary plea of guilty intelligently made in the light of the then applicable law does not 
become vulnerable because later judicial decisions indicate that the plea rested on a faulty 
premise.” Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Brady, 397 U.S. 
742, 757 (1970)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (holding that a defendant could not 
rely on a Supreme Court decision which made unconstitutional a provision relevant to his 
criminal sentence to argue that his plea was not voluntary). As the Lockett Court 
explained, plea agreements are rife with risks for both parties, and “[t]he possibility of a 
favorable change in the law occurring after a plea agreement is merely one of the risks 
that accompanies a guilty plea.” Id. at 214 (citing United States v. Sahlin, 399 F.3d 27 
(1st Cir. 2005)). Because any change in the law would not impact the fact that Mabry 
                                              
6 Defense counsel explained “collateral appeal” to Mabry: “It is a right after direct appeal 
for you, for instance, to raise issues that may have to do with my ineffectiveness or other 
collateral issues that could not have been raised on direct appeal.” Mabry I, 536 F.3d at 
234. 
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knowingly and voluntarily agreed to the terms of the waiver, the only question that 
remains is whether enforcing the waiver would work a miscarriage of justice. See Wilson, 
707 F.3d at 414.   
 The miscarriage of justice exception should “be applied sparingly and without 
undue generosity.” United States v. Wilson, 429 F.3d 455, 458 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting 
United States v. Teeter, 257 F.3d 14, 26 (1st Cir. 2001)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). We endorsed certain factors set forth by the First Circuit in considering whether 
an error has worked a miscarriage of justice to overcome an appellate waiver:  
[T]he clarity of the error, its gravity, its character (e.g., whether it concerns 
a fact issue, a sentencing guideline, or a statutory maximum), the impact of 
the error on the defendant, the impact of correcting the error on the 
government, and the extent to which the defendant acquiesced in the result.  
United States v. Khattak, 273 F.3d 557, 563 (3d Cir. 2001) (alteration in original) 
(quoting Teeter, 257 F.3d at 26).  
 Several of the factors from Khattak are applicable here. First, because Mabry 
entered into a plea agreement, he cannot demonstrate the gravity of any alleged error, 
even if we were inclined to exercise § 2241 jurisdiction. Under the terms of the plea 
agreement, five charges were dismissed, among them a charge for possession of a firearm 
in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime, which carried a mandatory consecutive five-
year sentence. Given the benefit Mabry received by accepting the plea, we cannot say 
what his sentence would have been absent the agreement. Moreover, Mabry was 
sentenced under advisory guidelines post-Booker and within the statutory maximum of 
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forty years. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B).7 Second, the impact on the Government would be 
great as it would eschew the finality and gatekeeping requirements of § 2255, allowing 
more prisoners an alternative and additional route to challenge the propriety of their 
sentences, and requiring the Government here to prosecute a more than ten-year-old 
crime. Finally, Mabry acquiesced in the result of the waiver. By agreeing to the terms of 
his plea agreement, five charges were dismissed and “the government agreed to surrender 
a mandatory consecutive term of imprisonment of five years as part of the consideration 
for the plea agreement.” Mabry I, 536 F.3d at 243 n.16.  
 After considering the factors from Khattak, we adhere to our precedent concerning 
this very Appellant and continue to enforce the appellate and collateral challenge waiver.   
III.  CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the dismissal of Mabry’s § 2241 petition. 
                                              
7 Mabry was sentenced pursuant to a converted calculation of 142.46 kilograms of 
marijuana because the offense involved both crack cocaine and cocaine powder. 
Presentence Investigative Report ¶ 11; see UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
§ 2D1.1.  
